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A Market-Based Approach to eRA
A recent proposal to change Community Reinvest-
ment Act (CRA) compliance standards suggests
that a major shift in emphasis may be underway.
CRA was passed in 1977, and it requires regula-
tors to encourage depository institutions (except
credit unions) to help meet the credit needs of
low and moderate income neighborhoods within
their service areas. The. language of the CRA stat-
ute was intentionally vague, balancing a social
policy goal of encouraging banks to lend in
lower income areas with regulators' concerns
about bank safety and soundness.
In recent years, this vagueness has created un-
certainty about how CRA will be enforced and
led to some disputes among banks, regulators,
and community groups. At the heart of the con-
troversy is the evaluation of lenders' CRA com-
pliance based on their efforts to make loans. The
current approach has been criticized as placing
too much emphasis on paper work and promo-
tional efforts and not enough emphasis on actual
lending. While bankers (and others) have seri-
ous objections to specific parts ofthe proposal,
the general sense is that banks are willing to be
judged on results rather than effort. Although
such a change might result in some form of credit
allocation, the certainty of meeting a measurable
standard could be preferable to vague evalua-
tions of effort.
This Letter discusses a refinement of a results-
based compliance measure, one that seeks to
achieve the goal with maximum efficiency: a
market-based system in which eRA obligations
can be traded among banks. An important prec-
edent for this approach in the area of compliance
involves anti-pollution laws. We describe how
this market for pollution credits operates, and
suggest that the experience in this market may
have implications for a market-based approach
to eRA compliance.
Efforts vs. results
Under the regulations promulgated by the bank-
ing agencies, CRA evaluations have been tied
explicitly to effort. The presumption underlying
the Act was that banks needed to make a good
faith effort to serve the credit needs of all com-
munities within their service areas. CRA ratings
focused primarily on banks' procedures for ad-
vertising and soliciting mortgage applications
from low-income and minority neighborhoods,
not on the numberof loan applications received
or granted.
Increasingly, the principal parties involved in
CRA have sought to move to more quantitative
standards, although for different reasons. Com-
munity groups have been dissatisfied with the
level of lending by banks to the target groups
and seek standards that would result in a higher
level of lending. Banks, on the other hand, have
found the reporting requirements to document
effort on CRA onerous and fraught with uncer-
tainty and are interested in a system with more
clearly delineated and measurable goals.
This distinction between evaluating compliance
based on effort compared to actual lending is
critical. An emphasis on effort assumes that CRA's
goal is to make sure that banks investigate all
lending opportunities in low-income neighbor-
hoods. Having done their homework, the efforts
orientation assumes that banks will employ
sound business decisions to.puisue profitable
loans in those areas just as they would in any
other area.
An emphasis on results, onthe other hand, is
essentially credit allocation (although it may not
be binding). That emphasis presumes that banks
have a responsibility to target some level of lend-
ing in low-income neighborhoods, regardless of
the quality of available loans. If, as some CRA
advocates suggest, there are many unexploited
good loans to be made in the area, banks actu-
ally may exceed target loan levels. But if not
enough "good" loans are found, a results orien-
tation could lead to making loans that are less
creditworthy.
A performance standard also runs the risk of
becoming a "cookie-cutter" approach. Faced
with a given standard, all eRA lenders could be
forced to allocate similar proportions of fundingFABSF
to CRA lending regardless of individual banks'
comparative advantages or the credit needs of
their communities.
A market approach
!t is possible to achieve results-oriented com-
pliance mOie efficiently by permitting market
forces to operate. After determining a quanti-
tative standard for loans to a target group and
apportioning initial obligations among banks to
meet those standards, market forces would per-
mit banksto make decisions about strategic in-
vestments to achieve those targets that fit their
particular comparative advantage.
In theJanuary 21 issue of the American Banker,
Professor Michael Klausner of New York Univer-
sity Law School proposed a specific market-
based approach to CRA. !n this proposal, all
banks would receive an obligation to lend to bor-
rowers from low- and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods. The size ofthe obligation would be
determined by some regulatory(or perhaps politi-
cal) guidelines and would be intended to achieve
the socially desirable level of low-income lend-
ing throughout the banking system. Banks could
satisfy this lending obligation in one of several
ways. They could make CRA loans directly, either
on their own or through lending consortia and
otherintermediaries that have been formed
around thecountry. Alternatively, banks could
purchase CRA loans originated by otherfinancial
intermediaries.
The novelty of the proposal is that banks also
could pay other banks to make CRA loans for
them. For example, Bank A could pay Bank B to
take on its CRA obligation. This transfer would
not eliminate Bank B's obligation to make its own
CRA loans. Instead, loans made on behalf of
another institution are merely added to a bank's
portfolio of CRA-qualifying loans. The terms of
the deal are left to negotiation between the two
banks.
The primary advantage of this system is that it
would allow greater variation in business prac-
tices among banks while still achieving the over-
all objective. Certain banking institutions could
focus their attention on particular areas of the
banking business, such as commercial lending or
retail banking, while others could choose to spe-
cialize more in making CRA-qualifying loans.
The advantage of specialization is consistent with
recent research on differential lending patterns
between neighborhoods (Gruben, Neuberger,
and Schmidt 1990; Board ofGovernors 1993).
One possible reason for these patterns relates to
bankers' access to information about the market
value of properties and the creditworthiness of
borrowers. If banks have been less active lenders
in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods,
they may have less information about these im-
portant variables. In addition,it may be costly for
them to obtain this information, thus making them
reluctant to lend in those areas. By encouraging
investment in information by some lenders, the
proposal couid lead these banks todevelop ex-
tensive databases of information about low-
income neighborhoods and borrowers. In so
doing,the problems associated with costly infor-
mation could be attenuated or even eliminated.
A market for CRA obligations gives certain banks
incentives to invest in the expertise needed to
make CRA loans. These banks could develop a
staff of lending officers who are familiar with the
credit needs of specific targeted neighborhoods,
who have extensive contacts with community ac-
tivists and neighborhood associations, and who
understand how to counsel low- and moderate-
income borrowers in the ways ofthe banking
system. Other banks, which might find such in-
vestments in their own staff prohibitively expen-
sive, could choose to support efforts by other
banks by purchasing credits from those banks.
Some may argue that this system would enable
banks to get out of their obligation to meet the
credit needs of the low- and moderate-income
areas of the communities in which they operate.
This needs not occur, however, since all banks
still would have a CRA obligation to satisfy. This
proposal just provides an additional, market-
based method to satisfy the obligation for the
whole market, while allowing variation among
institutions.
Another concern is that, since an individual bank
could sell its CRA obligation to another institu-
tion, low- and moderate-income neighborhoods
in the original bank's service area would be un-
derserved. This concern could be met, however,
by limiting the geographic scope of a traded CRA
obligation. For example, if Bank A pays Bank B
to meet its obligation, then Bank B must make
the appropriate amount of CRA-qualifying loans
in Bank Ns service area. If there are no low- or
moderate-income neighborhoods in Bank Ns
service area, then this limitation could be lifted,
and Bank B could satisfy the transferred CRA
obligation anywhere.
Setting results-oriented standards
One of the key issues ina results-based orienta-
tion is determining the standard against which to
measure results. A results orientation would re-
quire agreement on the appropriate level of CRABoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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Conclusions
If CRA policy moves from an effort-based stand-
ard to a results-based standard, policymakers
could take a cue from anti-pollution policy and
consider allowing trading of CRA obligations
among banks. As the market for pollution credits
has demonstrated, trading in an open market al-
lows variation among firms while achieving the
desired social result at minimum cost.
Another major advantage of a market is that it fa-
cilitates changing the desired outcome over time.
For example, Los Angeles is gradually reducing
the stock of pollution credits, resulting in im-
proved air quality. The market structure aids in
rationally achieving this objective by raising the
cost of a credit making firms search harder for
ways to reduce their emissions. Thus, if the target
level does not meet desired standards, the level






The advantage of a market in meeting such goals
can best be illustrated with a hypothetical ex-
ample. Consider two plants producing different
types of goods that both emit air pollution. Reg-
ulations require that emissions be reduced by a
specified amount. One plant can install a simple
pollution-control device or change its production
process at low cost to eliminate all of its pollu-
tion, but the other factory can reduce pollution
only by drastically changing its production facil-
ity at high cost. Under plant-by-plant compli-
ance, both factories would be required to meet
the same standards, causing the first plant to in-
cur very low costs and the second plant to incur
very high costs. Under a pollution credits market
system, the second plant pays the first plant to
make the relatively low-cost investment in pollu-
tion abatement to cover all of the mandated pol-
lution reduction. The net effect on pollution is
the same, but the cost is considerably lower.
Thus, activity and pricing in a market provides
feedback as to the "cost" of any given standard.
If the volume of trades is low and the premium
paid by a bank acquiring a CRA credit is low,
the standard is not imposing onerous costs. As the
standard rises, trading would rise and the pre-
mium also would rise. Ifthe premia observed are
very high, the standard may be too high, and that
would be a clear indicator that profitable lending
opportunities are scarce. Conversely, ifCRA ad-
vocates are right and sufficient quality lending
opportunities exist at the established standard,
then the premium would be small or nonexistent
and the quantity of CRA loans traded would be
minimal.
The way markets accomplish this feat is by re-
vealing the "cost" of a given standard. For ex-
ample, with very low standards, most banks will
be able to find sufficient CRA loans on their own.
As standards rise, it becomes harder for some
banks to find qualified borrowers, so they would
turn to banks better positioned to find additional
borrowers.. At some level, it may be necessary for
even the more specialized banks to turn to less
qualified borrowers, raising the risk to those
banks for holding the loan.
In any results-oriented approach, setting the ap-
propriate target level is problematic. However,
while markets do not provide sufficient a priori
information to determine the "correct" level,
they do provide automatic feedback information
to help adjust targets to systematically approach
that desired level.
lending in a given community even in a market-
based system. The required level of CRA lending
could be set in the aggregate as well as for local
markets, and could be determined in consulta-
tion with community groups, politicians, regula-
tors, and bankers. All participants thus would
know the basic parameters ofthe market.
The market for pollution credits
Developing a market for CRA obligations would
not be without precedent. While details differ,
similar institutions have been established to ad-
dress other social goals more efficiently. For ex-
ample, in the case of air pollution, regulators
have increasingly abandoned costly plant-by-
plant compliance standards in favor of area-wide
compliance. Markets that allow trading of pollu-
tion credits have made it possible to achieve the
desired results at lower cost.
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